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Overview 
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1. What will Help-to-Buy achieve? 
 What does economic theory predict? 
 Supporting empirical evidence 
2. Who benefits? 
 Winners and losers – not who you might 
think… 
3. What should the government (not) do? 
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Starting point: A real problem… 
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 House prices in UK are extraordinarily high 
 UK has second highest buying price per square 
metre in the world (only topped by tiny Monaco!) 
(Globalpropertyguide.com; last accessed March 2013) 
 And we live in extremely cramped housing! 
 A new-build house in UK is 38 percent smaller   
than in densely populated Germany and 40 
percent smaller than in the even more densely 
populated Netherlands (Statistics Sweden, 2005) 
 
 Might ‘Help to Buy’ solve this problem? 
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Insights from ‘Economics 101’ 
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 Main effect of Help to Buy 
 Equity loans and the mortgage guarantee both boost 
demand for housing, especially of first-time-buyers  
 Higher willingness-to-pay, all else equal 
 
 Also: starter homes and new builds are 
reasonably closes substitutes for other 
types of housing (incl. rental) 
 Positive effect on aggregate demand for 
housing 
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Insights from ‘Economics 201’ 
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 Policy strongly affects ability of potential 
first-time buyer to afford down-payment 
on starter home 
 
 Additional boost to housing demand 
 Because of capital gains & ‘moving up the 
housing ladder’ feeds through to trade-up 
homes 
Has substantial impact on overall housing 
market (Ortalo-Magné & Rady 2006) 
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The demand side… 
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What about supply? 
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 UK planning system extraordinarily inflexible 
 Since 1947: virtually no fiscal incentives at local 
level to permit development 
 Government reforms since 2010 not (yet) ‘biting’ 
 
 Underlying causes?  
 
 UK = highly centralized country, virtually no fiscal 
power at local level 
 Political power tilted towards homeowners 
(NIMBYs or better: BANANAs) 
 
 Perhaps world’s most restrictive planning 
system… 
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The supply side… 
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The effect of Help to Buy… 
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Evidence 
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 Hilber and Vermeulen (2010, 2012) 
 Demonstrate that tight local planning 
constraints in parts of England (in conjunction 
with strong demand) are to a good extent 
responsible for extraordinarily high house 
prices  
 Had the SE the restrictiveness of the NE, house 
prices in the SE would be 25% lower 
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Evidence (cont.) 
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 Hilber and Turner (forthcoming) 
 Mortgage interest deduction in US 
 Raises house prices in regulated cities  
 Reduces homeownership attainment in these 
cities 
 Zero overall effect on homeownership 
attainment 
 Why? Subsidy pushes up prices in constrained 
places and prevents marginal would-be-buyers 
from becoming homeowners 
 US wastes 100 Billion US-dollar each year! 
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Winners and Losers  
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 Main beneficiaries = Existing owners of 
owner-occupied housing 
 Mainly wealthy & elderly population 
 First time buyers not better-off  
 Mobile renters worse-off 
 Typically poor & young 
 Tax payers bear cost of schemes & risk  
 
 But wealthy also pay more taxes 
 Zero sum game? 
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We may ALL be losers… 
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1. Taxes needed to finance scheme have a 
‘deadweight loss’ 
 Pure welfare loss for society 
2. Systemic risk (…yet again) 
 Government does not only provide ‘implicit 
government guarantee’ but directly bears 
various costs and risks 
 If housing markets collapse then government 
takes direct hit… 
 Unlikely? Perhaps, but… 
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What should the government (not) do? 
 Subsidies to consumers are ineffective, 
costly & risky  
 
 Must tackle ‘supply side’ problems instead! 
 Give strong incentives to local authorities (and 
NIMBYs) to facilitate construction of new 
housing and expansion of existing housing 
 One idea (of many): Introduce proper local 
property tax and get rid of e.g. ‘absurd’ stamp 
duty (Mirrlees Review 2011; Hilber & Lyytikäinen 
2013) 
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And what can we learn from the  
US housing crisis? 
 Securitization can improve social welfare in 
principle BUT… 
 Design and implementation of securities market in US 
was flawed + markets were poorly regulated 
 Lessons from the US debacle 
1. Ensure competition – no monopoly or duopoly 
2. ‘Too big to fail’ is bad – commit to no government 
backing, so investors face true risks 
3. Regulation ought to focus on market efficiency and 
systemic risks 
 
  It appears British politicians may not have 
 learned these lessons…. 
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Q & A 
 
Thank you! 
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